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Abstract 
 
Educational investment involves risks and long-term commitment, and the degree of 
risk aversion or patience of parents could play a vital role in the schooling decision. Yet, 
there are few studies analyzing the impact of such preferences on educational 
investment. This paper utilizes a unique dataset with a large-scale field experiment of 
preferences and estimates the impacts of the patience and risk aversion of the parents on 
school attendance, delayed enrollment, and the education expenditure of their children 
in Uganda. Our results show that the risk aversion of the parent delays enrollment of 
young children, especially boys. This could be explained by parents’ security concerns 
for their young children. Girls of impatient parents have high attendance rates when 
they are young (6 – 9 years old) but have low attendance rates when they are older (10 – 
13 years old). Boys aged 10 to 13 have low attendance rates if their parents have a high 
present bias. Finally, the patience of the parents increases the education expenditure.  
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1 Introduction 
Despite the recent advancement in providing basic education to children in developing 
countries, 57 million children of primary school age remain out of school, including 30 
million children in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO, 2014). Among many potential 
barriers to children’s education are parental preferences on risk and time. Educational 
investment involves risks because of uncertain futures and the difficulty in assessing 
children’s abilities (Becker, 1964; Levhari and Weiss, 1974). In low-income countries, 
the risks are often further magnified due to poor schooling environments (Glewwe and 
Kremer, 2006; Porter et al., 2011). Education also requires long-term commitment in 
the sense that years of investment are required before the benefit can be realized 
(Hayami and Godo, 2004, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004).  
Past studies have noted the role of the risk and time preferences of parents, and 
there are empirical studies conducted in developed countries such as Italy and Germany, 
but, to the best of our knowledge, no study has estimated the associations between the 
measured risk and time preferences of parents with the education decision of their 
children in low income countries (Leonardi, 2007; Wölfel and Heineck, 2012). Recent 
studies from low-income countries that have attempted to investigate the relationship 
between preferences and educational investment have been limited to those analyzing 
the reverse impact of educational attainment on the time preferences or the determinants 
of the stated parental preference for education (Bauer and Chytilova, 2010b; Lincove, 
forthcoming). If risk and time preferences as explanatory variables are omitted from the 
estimation models of the educational investment, the estimation results could be biased 
when such preferences are correlated with some of the determinants (Dohmen et al., 
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2010). Indeed, due to the large variability in income and returns to schooling in rural 
areas, education could be considered a risky investment for which risk aversion is an 
important decision factor (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Sawada and Lokshin, 2009). In 
addition, non-economic factors, such as poor school quality and security concerns, may 
affect parents’ decisions (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Porter and Blaufuss, 2002). In 
developing countries, children often need to walk a long distance to attend school. 
Security along the roads to and from school is a serious concern, especially for young 
children, in particular girls (Porter et al., 2010). Thus, risk-averse parents may prefer 
delaying enrolment or taking their children out of school. Furthermore, myopic parents 
may prefer receiving immediate returns from their children’s labor, instead of waiting 
for future returns.  
In this paper, by using results from field experiments on risk and time 
preferences of survey respondents, we explicitly estimate the associations between risk 
and time preferences of the respondents, who are mostly fathers, and the investment in 
their children’s schooling in Uganda. The survey and the economic experiment were 
conducted in Uganda, covering 1,289 households in 94 villages across the country. 
From the total sample, we use data from 583 households who have 1,586 primary-
school-age children, aged 6 to 13, in order to examine the relationship between parental 
preferences and the educational outcomes of their children. The results in the paper 
indicate that risk-averse parents delay enrollment of young children, especially boys. 
Girls of impatient parents have a high attendance rate when they are young (6 – 9 years 
old) but a low attendance rate when they are older (10 – 13 years old). It appears that 
impatient parents want to start the schooling of their girls early and finish it early. When 
parents have a high present bias, boys aged 10 to 13 have a low attendance rate possibly 
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because their parents value present income more over future income. Finally, we find 
that patient parents spend more on education expenditure. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework 
on the relationship between risk and time preferences and provides background 
information about the primary education system in Uganda. The key research questions 
of this paper are also presented in this section. Section 3 describes the data used in this 
paper, while Section 4 explains the methodology for our analysis. We discuss the 
empirical results in Section 5, before we conclude the paper in Section 6. 
 
2 Role of Risk Aversion and Patience in Educational Investment in Uganda 
Conceptual Framework 
Educational investment can be risky due to the non-marketability of and difficulty in 
diversifying human capital accumulated from the investment (Becker, 1962; Levhari 
and Weiss, 1974). In developing countries, additional issues that arise from the 
uncertain quality of public schools, security concerns, and the intermittent need to 
withdraw children from school due to variable agricultural income make the educational 
investment even riskier for farming households (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Porter et al, 
2010; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Sawada and Lokshin, 2009). If education is a risky 
investment, the more risk-averse the parents are, the less they will invest in their 
children’s education. Because formal education spans over many years, the degree of 
patience may also affect the parental decision for schooling. 
 
Parent’s Maximization Model 
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The optimization problem with risky education was first modeled by Levhari and Weiss 
(1974). Their main objective was to analyze the effect on the optimal investment of 
risks themselves, rather than the attitude towards risks. Therefore, the degree of risk 
aversion (or the discount rate) plays little role in their discussion. It is also a personal 
choice model instead of a household model. Nonetheless, their model highlights the role 
of uncertainty in educational investment, and the first-order conditions give some basis 
for the analysis. The mathematical illustration is given in Annex 1. The difference 
between Becker’s (1964) model of human capital investment and that of Levhari and 
Weiss (1974) is that expectation is taken for the utilities due to uncertainty. In each 
period, the budget consists of own income and net assets. Here, the income in the future 
period depends on both the human capital accumulated from the schooling investment 
in period zero and the future unknown state of the world. In contrast, today’s income is 
assumed to be exogenously given. 
The model derives two main implications. First, the rate of substitution between 
the marginal utility from the present consumption and the expected marginal utility 
from the future consumption equals the rate of returns on the other assets, given that the 
rate is known. If subjective discounting is incorporated, this substitution ratio is the rate 
of returns on the other assets weighted by the discount rate. Therefore, all other things 
being equal, the higher the discount rate, the smaller the level of household 
consumption allocated to today than to the future at the optimum.  
Second, the utility weighted expected marginal benefit of additional earnings in 
the future due to schooling investments equals that which is due to investments in other 
assets. The parent chooses the investment amount between the riskier and the safer 
assets so that the expected benefit from one equals the benefit from the other. Note that 
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the expected returns on schooling investments depend upon the individual’s future 
income, which in turn depends upon the random variable representing future uncertainty. 
Therefore, depending on the variability of a child’s future income and the degree of risk 
aversion, the choice of schooling investment may vary (Levhari and Weiss, 1974).  
Again, assuming that the rate of returns on the other assets is known, under certain 
conditions, the more risk averse the individual is, the less investment is allocated to 
education, which results in future income variability.1 
Past empirical evidence from the field of agriculture shows a positive correlation 
between lower risk aversion and the higher likelihood of investment in modern 
technology (Binswanger, 1980; Liu, 2008). Patience is also associated with mothers that 
have more young children, implying the role of more forward-oriented preferences in 
ensuring the welfare of the children (Bauer and Chytilová, 2010a). Similarly, risk 
tolerance and the patience of the parents may also increase educational investment for 
their children and raise the children’s future income.  
 
Education in Uganda 
In order to argue that education is a relatively risky investment, we need to look at the 
risks attached to schooling for our sample households in rural Uganda. After the 
abolition of school fees in public schools through the universal primary education 
policy introduced in 1997, the net enrollment ratio for primary school increased from 
around 60% to over 80%, but the sudden increase in enrollment was followed by a 
decrease in internal efficiency resulting in a substantial number of school drop-outs 
(Deininger, 2003; Nishimura et al., 2008).  
                                                     
1 Further explanation is in Annex 1. 
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The situation is especially severe in rural areas. Parents and children in the 
villages cite various reasons for drop-out besides financial constraints including long 
distances, early pregnancies, and a lack of interest (Nishimura et al., 2008; Musisi et al., 
2003). First, giving “long distances to school” as a reason for drop-out implies not only 
the high travelling cost of time and commuting expenses, but also that children often 
experience accidents and other dangers on the way that may put the children at risk, 
similar to the case in rural Ghana (Lincove, forthcoming; Porter et al., 2010). Second, 
the lack of interest could partly be attributed to overcrowding, teacher absence, or other 
poor school quality issues often found in rural public schools that add to the 
uncertainties of the returns to education so much so that it may even induce parents to 
send their children to private schools at additional cost (Musisi et al., 2003, Nishimura 
and Yamano, 2013). As of 2012, the Ugandan government target was to allocate 1 
classroom for every 55 pupils in primary schools, but the actual average class size for 
Primary 1 is 64 pupils, and it increases to more than 80 pupils in some rural districts 
(Uganda MOES, 2012). Third, early pregnancies could also be considered as a risk in 
sending daughters to school since such an event often terminates the girl’s education 
indefinitely. As Nishimura and Yamano (2013) illustrate, parents in developing 
countries may then have different preferences on the level of educational investment 
across gender.  
 
Key Research Questions 
The important question to be answered is whether parental risk and time preferences 
have an impact on the educational investment and outcomes of the children. If the more 
risk tolerant parent invests more in education, then the policy implication is that primary 
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education is indeed perceived as a risky investment, and policies should reduce such 
riskiness of education. As we discussed above, riskiness may derive from security 
issues, internal inefficiency, and variable returns from education. If low expected 
returns are not much of a concern for parents in Uganda as Lincove (forthcoming) 
suggests, then more resources should be allocated to improving the security and 
efficiency of schools. From the inter-temporal model, we also hypothesize that patience 
increases educational investment. Again, if patient parents invest more in education, 
then education is perceived as a long-term investment. In order to reduce the high 
expected cost, subsidies for the children who progress to upper classes may be an 
effective solution. Last but not least, we investigate whether the risk and time 
preferences affect the education of boys and girls differently. Depending on the result, 
gender-specific policies may need to be developed.  
 This study takes advantage of a nationally representative experiment carried out 
in rural Uganda and tests whether the measured risk aversion parameters and the 
discount rates of the parents are associated with the schooling performance of the 
children in the household such as attendance, delayed enrollment, and educational 
expenditure. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to carry out such an 
empirical analysis in a developing country.  
  
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data 
The data we use in this paper were collected as part of the Research on Poverty, 
Environment and Agricultural Technology (RePEAT) project. The project was 
conducted by Makerere University in Uganda and the Foundation for Advanced Studies 
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on International Development.2 The risk and time preference data were collected in a 
field experiment conducted in March 2009. The details of the experimental design and 
the estimation method for the preference parameters are described in Tanaka and Munro 
(2014). The survey data regarding the children’s education and the household 
characteristics were collected during the household surveys in 2009. 
In total, data are available on 1,586 children aged 6 to 13 living in 583 
households from 90 rural communities in the Western, Central, and Eastern regions of 
Uganda. The Northern region is excluded from the survey due to security concerns. The 
main livelihood of the surveyed households is agriculture, and on average, the farm 
income constitutes around 60 percent of the total household income (Yamano et al., 
2004). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the household. The average age of the 
household head is 46.5 years old. The highest grade completed by male and female 
adults in the household is 7.9 and 7.0 years for males and females, respectively. Around 
11 percent of the household heads are female. As for the wealth indicators, the average 
land size is 7.4 acres, and the average asset value is USD 339.3 The sampled children 
are aged 6 to 13. Since the investment decision for adolescents can be affected by the 
adolescents themselves, we do not include the analysis here. 4  In terms of the 
relationship to the head, around 73 percent of the sampled children are the children of 
the household heads. Other main relationships to the head include ‘grandchild’ and 
‘niece or nephew’. Half of our sampled children are female.  
 
                                                     
2 This work is funded by the Global COE program at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan 
(GRIPS). 
3 Note: 1USD=1930 Uganda shillings. 
4 The discussion on adolescents’ schooling and their relationship to risk and time preferences are 
discussed in Munro and Tanaka (2014). 
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Risk and Time Preference 
Table 1 includes the average preference parameters of the household heads who were 
participants in the field experiments. As we describe in the table, 73 % of the children in 
our study are the children of the household head, 18 % are grandchildren, and 9 % are 
others. Thus, in this paper, we assume that the household heads make schooling 
decisions of these children living in their households.5 This is a limitation of this study 
in that we only have preference data from one household head or a care taker. We 
discuss more regarding this limitation later in this paper.   
The mean risk aversion parameter, σ, is 1.30 which is comparable to earlier 
estimates, between 0.81 and 2.0, of an earlier study in another African country, Zambia, 
(Wik and Holden, 1998 as cited in Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008).6 The loss aversion 
parameter, λ, is also included in the analysis. Loss aversion is a concept whereby losses 
loom larger than the gains of the same magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
which Tanaka and Munro (2014) argue, could be a significant aspect of the attitude 
towards risks for rural farmers in Uganda. The average loss aversion of 3.22 implies 
that, on average, a decrease in utility from losing USD1 has an equal magnitude to an 
increase in utility from gaining USD 3. The average discount rate, r, is 49 percent.7 This 
is substantially higher than those found in previous studies, which are usually measured 
in annual rates (Cardenas and Carpenters, 2008). A large part of the deviation probably 
comes from the hypothetical nature of the question. The focus, however, is not so much 
                                                     
5 This assumption is reasonable in many developing countries where orphaned children are often fostered 
into extended families who take care of their welfare (Ainsworth and Filmer, 2002; Yamano et al, 2006). 
6 Assuming the CRRA utility function, 
𝐶1−𝜎
1−𝜎
, the curvature of the utility function, σ𝑗, represents the risk 
attitude and is negative for the risk lovers, zero for the risk neutral, and positive for the risk-averse 
individuals. 
7 Note that 
1
1+r
= β, the discount factor. 
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on the absolute values of the discount rates as on their relative sizes, which may affect 
schooling investment outcomes differently across households. Lastly, the average 
degree of present bias, d, is 0.75.8 Around 60 percent of the household heads have 
present bias, indicating that for those household heads, the present consumption is 
weighted especially higher than the utilities derived from consumptions at any future 
dates.  
 
Village and School Characteristics 
Information about village and school characteristics were collected in a community 
survey, which was carried out along with the household survey in 2009. School teachers 
or others knowledgeable about the schools in their village completed the community 
survey. On average at the village level, the average distance to primary school is 2.5 km, 
although for one in five sampled villages, the distance is more than 3.5 km, and in six 
very remote villages, the distance is substantially longer, between 5 km and 10 km 
(Table 1). Considering 78 percent of main roads are dirt or murram, one can imagine the 
difficulty of commuting to school, especially in the rainy season when large puddles 
make roads impassable in hilly areas. The average number of primary schools, 
including small schools operated by communities, is 3.7. The average number of pupils 
per classroom is 69, which is close to the average class size of 64 pupils nationwide in 
2012 (Uganda MOES, 2012), as we discussed in Section 2.  
 
                                                     
8 Note that 𝑢𝑇 = 𝑚𝑇 + 𝑑 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝑡=∞
𝑡=1 𝑚𝑇+𝑡, where u𝑇 is the utility derived at time T from streams of 
incomes m𝑇+𝑡 over time and d is the degree of present bias. 
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Children’s schooling and parents’ preference 
The schooling status of our sample children is shown in Table 2. The overall school 
attendance rate is 89.6 percent, which is comparable to the national average of 91.3 
percent in 2009 (UNESCO data, 2014). Among those attending, however, 71.8 percent 
have delayed enrollment by at least one year and 33.1 percent have repeated grades at 
least once. Only 16.9 percent have neither delayed enrollment nor repeated grades, 
suggesting a high level of inefficiency.  
Comparing girls’ and boys’ performances, there is no statistically significant 
difference between their attendance rates. This is consistent with the finding that the 
universal primary education policy has reduced the gender parity in school access 
(Nishimura et al., 2008). However, the proportion of delayed enrollment is lower for 
girls at 70.1 percent than for boys at 73.6, though the difference is not statistically 
significant. Lastly, the difference across gender in the percentages of those who have 
ever repeated is minimal at 0.1 percentage points. These base results suggest that girls 
have better school progression than boys, but the difference may partly be due to the 
different preferences of the parents for girls and boys. In the later regression analysis, 
we will examine the effect of parental preferences on children’s schooling separately for 
boys and girls.  
In Table 3, we look at the schooling investment statistics by the preference 
groups of the household heads defined as follows. We categorized the household heads 
into four risk categories. The first category is “risk loving or neutral” which includes 
those subjects with 𝜎 equal to or less than zero. All other subjects that are risk averse by 
definition are divided into thirtile groups: the lowest thirtile “slightly risk averse” group 
includes those with 0 < 𝜎 ≤ 1.1, the middle thirtile “moderately risk averse” group 
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includes those with 1.1 < 𝜎 ≤ 2.06, and the highest thirtile “very risk averse” group 
includes those with 𝜎 > 2.06. Four categories are created for the time preference as 
well: the four quartile groups, “very patient”, “moderately patient”, “slightly patient” 
and “impatient”, include those with discount rates, r ≤ 21.8, 21.8 < r ≤ 36.04, 36.04 < r 
≤ 53.6, and r > 53.6 percent, respectively.  
Comparing the children’s schooling according to the household heads’ risk 
preference, while attendance rates are highest for children with “very risk averse” 
household heads at 90.6 percent, delayed enrollment is again highest at 1.71 years on 
average for children with “very risk averse” heads. The descriptive results partly 
support our expectation that risk aversion decreases investment in risky education 
through delayed enrollment. The educational expenditure per school-age child shows no 
specific trend, although the “slightly risk averse” heads seem to invest the highest 
amount at USD 62.9 per child. 
 The descriptive statistics showing the relationship between children’s 
education and household heads’ time preference are also partly in line with our 
expectation that patience increases investment. The “very patient” household heads 
spend on average USD 66.4 per school-age child, which is higher than that of heads in 
any other time preference categories. However, the schooling of the children has an 
opposite trend. The children of “very patient” household heads have on average the 
lowest attendance rates and more delay in enrollment than children from other 
categories. The inconsistency in our base statistics may be due to uncontrolled factors. 
We examine the relationship more rigorously in the following regression analyses. 
14 
 
 
4 Empirical Model 
In estimating the role of the risk and time preferences of the parents in the educational 
investment decisions for the children, we employ the reduced-form estimation method 
following Glewwe and Kremer (2009) and Weir (2011): 
  𝐸 = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝐻, V) ,       (1) 
where E represents the measure of educational investment inputs such as school 
attendance, delay in enrollment, and the dollar amount of educational expenditure per 
child; C, H, and V  represent variables at the child, household, and village level, 
respectively. As Glewwe and Kremer (2006) argue, the parental choice of inputs 
includes the ensuring of the children’s school attendance, timely enrollment and 
payment of school related expenses.9  
Applying the above method, we first estimate the probability of attending school. 
A probit model is used for estimating the probability of attending school: 
    Pr(𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 1) = 𝑓(𝐻𝑗, 𝐶𝑖𝑗, 𝑉) ,      (2) 
 
where the outcome variable, 𝐴𝑖𝑗, takes one if the child in household j attends school, 
and zero otherwise; 𝐻𝑗 includes a set of the preference parameters, σ (risk aversion), λ 
(loss aversion), r (discount rate) and d (degree of present bias); and 𝐶𝑖𝑗 includes a set of 
characteristics of the child i from household j. Since the schooling risks and value of 
children’s time may vary depending on the age and gender of the children, we estimate 
the model for all children as well as separately by gender and age group (6 to 9 years 
old and 10 to 13 years old). 
                                                     
9 In our regression analyses, we exclude the analysis of grade repetition since grade repetition is highly 
affected by external factors such as results of school exams in the Ugandan educational system, resulting 
in the decision being made more by the school than by the parents. 
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Second, we estimate the probability of delayed enrollment. Again, the probit 
model is used: 
 Pr(D𝑖𝑗 = 1) = 𝑓(H𝑗, C𝑖𝑗 , 𝑉) ,      (3) 
 
where the outcome variable, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 , takes one if the child in household j has delayed 
enrollment by at least one year, and zero otherwise.  
Last, we estimate the household educational expenditure per school-age child. 
Here, we use the Tobit model assuming that for many children, including those who are 
out of school: 
  E𝑗 = {
𝐸𝑗
∗      𝑖𝑓  𝐸𝑗
∗ > 0 
0      𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 ,          (4) 
where E𝑗 is the observed amount of educational expenditure per school aged child in 
household j. 
As for the explanatory variables, 𝐻𝑗  represents a set of household-related 
variables including the risk aversion, loss aversion and discount rate parameters of the 
household head, as well as his/her age and gender. The highest grade completed by male 
and female members, as well as the numbers of school aged children are included to 
control for the effect of competition among the children in the household for the 
educational investment (Sawada and Lokshin, 2009).  The number of infants represents 
the demand for labor at home (Musisi et al., 2003). Household wealth is represented by 
the log of land size and the asset values.  
We also control for a set of village level characteristics, 𝑉, including education- 
related variables such as the average distance to primary school, the number of primary 
and secondary schools, and the pupil to classroom ratio, and more general measures 
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such as population density, distance to nearest town, and a dummy variable representing 
whether the road to the nearest town is tarmacked or not. 
For all the above estimations, we cluster the standard errors at the household 
level as the majority of the variables are at the household level, not to mention the 
variable of interest, namely the parent’s risk and time preference parameters.  
 
5 Results 
Determinants of school attendance 
The estimation results for the determinants of school attendance are shown in Table 4. 
Column (1) is the result for all sampled children. First, the result shows that after 
controlling for the child, household, and village characteristics, risk aversion and loss 
aversion are positively related to children’s school attendance, though the results are not 
statistically significant. These results are opposite to our expectation. It may be possible 
that the parents are not less concerned about the riskiness of the current schooling but 
more about risks in losing better income opportunities that are attained only through 
educational investment. However, such argument for parental expectation in education 
is hardly convincing when the educational progress is poor and even completion of the 
primary level is doubtful for the majority of the children in the sampled households.  
Second, while the discount rate has a positive impact on children’s school attendance, 
the degree of present bias has a negative impact on the attendance. The former result is 
puzzling in that it implies that impatient parents tend to send their children to school 
more than patient ones do. This may be due to patient household heads believing that 
older children learn better and have higher returns, thus lowering the total proportion of 
primary school age children going to school. The latter result is consistent with our 
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expectation that myopic parents are more interested in the immediate financial 
reward/saving gained through keeping children away from costly education.  
Columns (2) to (5) show the results for the attendance by gender and age group. 
One of the interesting results is that parental risk aversion is only positively associated 
with the school attendance of older groups aged 10 to 13 for both boys and girls 
(column 4 and 5). In fact, the risk aversion is negatively associated with the school 
attendance of younger groups although the result is not statistically significant (column 
2 and 3). These results suggest that risk-averse parents may especially be concerned 
about sending young children to school due to security concerns.  
The impact of time preference on schooling also varies between different age 
groups. On one hand, older boys of less myopic household heads (with lower present 
biasedness) are more likely to attend school (column 4). Similarly, the more patient the 
parent is (with lower discount rate), the higher the chance that older girls attend school 
(column 5).  On the other hand, impatience is positively associated with more schooling 
for younger girls (column 3). These results suggest that impatient and more myopic 
household heads cannot wait for children, both boys and girls, to complete basic 
education at older ages. Especially for girls, impatient parents may tend to send their 
girls to school early and pull them out early, too. 
Other household characteristics that are significant are as follows. The log of 
assets value is positively associated with the attendance of older boys and younger girls, 
and negatively associated with that of older girls. It is possible that wealthier 
households tend to invest longer in boys’ education than girls’ education, while girls in 
poorer households tend to delay girls’ enrollment in school due to the lack of necessary 
finances. The highest grade completed by male or female members in the household has 
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no significant impact with higher attendance, but this is due to controlling for village 
level variation as well as preferences which are correlated with the educational 
attainment of adults.10 The age of the household head is negatively associated with 
school attendance, which may be because older parents require more help at home or 
are less sensitized about the importance of schooling. When there is a higher number of 
school aged children in the household, older girls tend to attend school, which is 
counter-intuitive if competition among siblings exists. This result is difficult to explain 
but may be due to selection by individual abilities which may be higher for girls. 
Interestingly, similar results showing a positive association between household size and 
girls’ school attendance is found in Lincove (forthcoming). Nonetheless, the number of 
infants in a household negatively affects the attendance of girls, though the results are 
not statistically significant. Lastly, among village level characteristics, the outstanding 
result is that the average classroom size is negatively associated with higher attendance. 
This is consistent with previous studies showing that better school infrastructure 
improves schooling performance (Glewwe et al., 2013). 
 
Determinants of delayed enrollment 
The estimation results on delayed enrollment are reported in Table 5. Column (1) shows 
the result for all sampled children who are currently attending school. The risk aversion 
parameter is statistically significantly related with the probability of delayed enrollment 
as predicted by our model. This is probably due to aversion to risks attached to 
education in rural areas for children. Children may encounter danger while travelling 
                                                     
10 When we look at the base regression without variables representing preferences or village level factors, 
the highest education level of female members is positively correlated with attendance, which is 
consistent with previous studies (Nishimura et al., 2008). 
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long distances to school, which may deter parents from sending children early. 
Alternatively, risk-averse farmers may prefer to keep young children for household or 
farm labor in order to cope with income shocks. This option may be morally easier than 
pulling a child out of school once attending. Column (2) and (3) are the results of the 
estimates for boys and girls respectively. Here, the risk aversion is significantly 
associated with the enrollment delay of boys but not that of girls. This may be due to 
boys being smaller in physical size at the enrollment age. Statistical evidence suggests 
that boys are more likely to be shorter and more underweight than girls when they are 
younger than 5 years old in Uganda and in Sub-Saharan Africa in general (Bahiigwa 
and Younger 2005, UBOS, 2012; UNESCO, 2014). No other preference parameters are 
statistically significant for either specification, although both impatience and the degree 
of present bias seem to correlate positively with the delay. Again, if parents believe that 
older children have better long-term school attainment, they may be induced to delay 
schooling.  
In terms of other household level determinants of enrollment delay, first, the 
educational attainment of male household members lowers the chance of the delay, 
especially for boys. This result suggests that household heads in households with men 
with higher educational attainment may be more aware of the importance of timely 
enrollment, though it only affects the decision for boys and not for girls. Second, the 
larger number of school aged children and the existence of infants increase the 
probability of delayed enrollment, especially for boys. This is puzzling, but again it is 
possible that in a larger family the chance is higher that a boy grows slower than he 
does in a smaller family, hence the higher likelihood to delay schooling. Lastly, the 
children in households with higher asset values are delayed less in primary school 
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enrollment regardless of gender. Since the likelihood of older girls’ attendance 
decreases with wealth (Table 4), the results put together support the argument that girls 
in wealthier households tend to spend less time in school than girls in poorer households, 
possibly because of financially better opportunity outside schooling such as marriage.11 
In terms of children’s characteristics, girls delay less in enrollment than boys. 
This is contrary to our expectation. Yet, this may suggest that due to parents’ preference 
for girls to marry early, as it is still the norm in many rural areas, girls are enrolled more 
promptly than boys to basic education. 
 
Determinants of educational expenditure 
The estimation result on educational expenditure per child is reported in Table 6. After 
controlling for child, household and village characteristics, the discount rate is 
negatively associated with the amount of educational investment. 12  This result is 
consistent with the expectation that the more patient the parent is, the greater the 
investment in education. If education increases patience as previous studies have shown, 
our result indicates that there is a positive cycle of educational investment enhancing 
further education through more forward oriented preferences. 
 
                                                     
11 Again, curiously, a similar result is found in Lincove (forthcoming) that the wealthier the household, 
the higher the probability of girls working. 
12 In the analysis of educational expenditure, we use the village dummy variables to fully control for 
village level factors. Such specification was difficult in the probit models of attendance and delayed 
enrollment because many observations were dropped due to collineality. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between the risk and time 
preferences of the survey respondents, mostly fathers, and their children’s school 
performance. We have four main results. First, controlling for individual, household, 
and village characteristics, respondents’ risk aversion is positively related to the delayed 
enrollment of their children, especially for boys. This could be because risk-averse 
parents or care-takers are concerned about their young children walking to and from 
school over a long distance. Boys tend to be smaller than girls when they are about to 
start schooling. This may explain why we find this result for boys. Delayed enrollment, 
however, is not a preferred option. Recent studies show that prompt enrollment is 
crucial for smooth progression through the primary level education (United Nations, 
2014). In rural settings, the later the enrollment is, the more likely it is that the child is 
pulled out of school before the completion of primary level due to labor demands at 
home and on the farm.  
Second, girls of impatient household heads have a high attendance rate when 
they are young, aged 6 to 9, but a low attendance rate when they are old, aged 10 to 13. 
It seems that impatient household heads want to start the schooling of their girls early 
and finish it early. Even impatient household heads realize the importance of basic 
education, such as reading and writing, but may want to limit the time and resources for 
the education of their girls.  
Third, when household heads have a high present bias, boys aged 10 to 13 have 
a low attendance rate. This could be because the parents value present income more 
over future income. Boys in this age group can work on own farms or earn income 
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outside. Parents who have a high bias towards present income may not be able to wait 
for future income.  
Finally, patient household heads spend more on education expenditure. This is 
consistent with the result on the third finding.  
There are several limitations to our analyses in the paper. First, only one 
respondent participated in the risk and time preference experiments from one household. 
Most of the respondents are the fathers to the children studied in this paper. Thus, the 
estimation results in this paper are mostly about the risk and time preferences of fathers. 
If mothers had participated in the experiments, the results of this paper might have been 
different. Future studies should collect the risk and time preferences of both fathers and 
mothers. Another limitation of our analysis is that it is limited to data on a single period 
and may not fully capture the extent of investment or the changes in the constraint sets 
in the educational history of each child.  
In this paper, we find that both the risk and time preferences of parents are 
important determinants of the schooling of their children. To encourage even risk-averse 
parents to invest in their children’s education, policy makers need to make schools a 
safe place to study, make travelling to school secure, in addition to making school 
investment safe through economic development. Myopic parents need to be educated 
about future returns from their children’s education. It is not surprising that parents’ 
preferences affect their children’s schooling. However, few studies have included them 
in empirical analyses because preference data were unavailable, especially in low 
income countries. Recent developments in eliciting people’s preferences through 
experiments will enable researchers to include parents’ preferences in the analyses of 
child education in the future.  
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
   
 Mean s.d. 
 Risk and Time Preferences of Household head   
 Risk Aversion Parameter (σ) 1.30 (1.30) 
 Loss Aversion Parameter (λ) 3.22 (2.68) 
 Discount Rate Parameter (r) 49.0 (43.0) 
 Degree of Present Bias (d) 0.75 (0.26) 
   
Household head Characteristics   
 Female Headed (=1) 0.11 (0.31) 
1) 
 Head Age 46.5 (13.3) 
   
Household Characteristics   
 Highest Grade Completed – Male 7.9 (3.8) 
 Highest Grade Completed – Female 7.0 (3.6) 
 Number of school age children (aged 6 to 18) 3.7 (2.0) 
 Number of infants (aged 5 or younger) 1.4 (1.2) 
 Land (acre) 7.4 (24.5) 
 Assets Value (USD)1 338.9 (952.6) 
   
Child’s Characteristics (age 6 - 13)   
Age 9.6 (2.3) 
Female (=1) 0.5 (0.5) 
Relationship to Head (% of total)   
    Child 0.73 (0.44) 
    Grand child 0.18 (0.39) 
    Nephew / Niece 0.05 (0.22) 
    Other relative / non-relative 0.04 (0.19) 
   
Village and School Characteristics   
 Average distance to primary school (km) 2.5 1.7 
 Number of primary schools 3.7 1.7 
 Number of secondary schools 2.5 1.4 
 Pupil to classroom ratio 69 27 
 Population density (per km2) 317 410 
 Distance to nearest town (km) 20.2 16.3 
 Road to nearest town tarmacked (=1) 0.22 0.42 
   
Sampled Villages 90  
Sampled Households 583  
Sampled Children 1546  
   
 
Note: 1.  1USD=1930 Ugandan shillings.   
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Table 2: Schooling Performance of Sampled Children aged 6 to 13 
 
Total no. 
of obs 
Average 
 
Girls Boys Difference1 
  (% total)  (% total) (% total)  
    (a) (b) (a)-(b) 
       
Attendance Rate  1,546 89.6  90.2 88.9 1.3 
       
% of those with at least 1 
year Delay in Enrollment† 
1,382 71.8 
 
70.1 73.6 -3.5 
       
No. of years delayed if 
delayed 
  
 
   
1 year 362 36.5  37.0 36.0  
    2 years 317 32.0  31.2 32.7  
    3 years or more 313 31.5  31.8 31.3  
       
% of those with at least 1 
year Grade Repetition† 
1,376 33.1  33.0 33.1 -0.1 
       
       
No. of observation  1546  789 757  
 
Note: † only for those attending.   
1. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% in t-test comparing means of the 
girls’ and boys’ performance. 
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Table 3: Children’s Schooling by Household Head’s Preference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 1. For the risk preference: ‘Risk Loving or Neutral’ means the risk aversion parameter, σ <=0, ‘Slightly Risk Averse’ means 0 < σ <= 1.1, ‘Moderately Risk Averse’ means  
1.1 < σ <= 2.06 and ‘Very Risk Averse’ means σ >2.06. 2. For the time preference: ‘Very Patient’ means the subjective discount rate r <=21.8%, ‘Moderately Patient’ means 21.8 < 
r <= 36.04%, ‘Slightly Patient’ means 36.04% < r <=53.6 and ‘Impatient’ means r > 53.6.  
†
Statistics for years of delay in enrollment are only for those attending school at the time 
of the interview.  
Preference of 
Household Head 
Number of 
Household 
Number of 
Children 
Attendance 
Rate 
Years of 
Delay in 
Enrollment† 
Educational 
Expenditure Per 
School-Age 
Child 
(USD) 
 no. no. % mean Mean 
Risk Preference1      
 Risk Loving or Neutral 108 290 89.0 1.54 24.6 
 Slightly Risk Averse 163 440 90.0 1.51 62.9 
 Moderately Risk Averse 157 410 88.5 1.58 48.3 
 Very Risk Averse 155 406 90.6 1.71 37.2 
      
Time Preference2      
 Very Patient 138 357 88.0 1.63 66.4 
 Moderately Patient 143 389 89.2 1.68 40.4 
 Slightly Patient 149 407 88.7 1.54 57.2 
 Impatient 153 393 92.4 1.53 18.6 
      
Total 583 1546 89.6 1.59 45.1 
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Table 4: Determinants of School Attendance by Gender and Age Group (Probit Model) 
Variables 
All 
Boys 
(age 6-9) 
Girls 
(age 6-9) 
Boys 
(age 10-13) 
Girls 
(age 10-13) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Risk and Time Preferences of 
Household Head 
     
 Risk Aversion Parameter (σ) 0.047 -0.015 -0.071 0.719*** 0.288* 
 (1.06) (-0.21) (-0.88) (2.99) (1.72) 
 Loss Aversion Parameter (λ) 0.025 0.001 0.014 0.039 0.217* 
 (0.93) (0.03) (0.34) (0.38) (1.82) 
 Discount Rate Parameter (r) 0.003* 0.002 0.010*** 0.006 -0.020*** 
 (1.70) (0.77) (3.09) (1.14) (-2.91) 
 Degree of Present Bias (d) -0.476** 0.243 -0.683 -2.755** -0.143 
 (-2.27) (0.70) (-1.56) (-2.38) (-0.18) 
Household Head Characteristics      
 Head Age -0.012** -0.010 -0.006 -0.062*** -0.040* 
 (-2.26) (-1.00) (-0.62) (-3.35) (-1.68) 
 Female Headed (=1) 0.053 0.019 0.803 1.483*** -0.521 
 (0.26) (0.05) (1.51) (2.65) (-0.75) 
Household Characteristics      
 Highest Grade Completed – Male 0.018 0.012 0.023 -0.042 0.126 
 (0.96) (0.44) (0.70) (-0.80) (1.56) 
 Highest Grade Completed – Female 0.024 0.055 0.038 0.035 0.027 
 (1.21) (1.48) (1.04) (0.62) (0.35) 
 Number of school-age children -0.030 -0.089* -0.065 -0.099 0.388** 
(aged 6 to 18) (-0.87) (-1.71) (-1.59) (-1.22) (2.41) 
 Number of infants (aged 5 or younger) 0.044 0.057 0.021 0.323** -0.106 
 (1.04) (0.86) (0.23) (2.01) (-0.48) 
 Log of land size (acre) 0.014 0.263 0.003 -0.335 0.194 
 (0.20) (1.62) (0.04) (-1.38) (0.71) 
 Log of assets value (USD)1 0.134** -0.106 0.294*** 1.114*** -0.598*** 
 (1.98) (-0.84) (2.72) (4.85) (-2.64) 
Child’s Characteristics (age 6 - 13)      
Age 0.248*** 0.524*** 0.593*** -0.317** -0.791*** 
 (8.38) (6.02) (5.51) (-2.39) (-3.70) 
Female (=1) 0.096     
 (0.94)     
Relationship to Head:       
    Grand child 0.229 0.323 -0.140 0.861** 0.939 
 (1.23) (1.02) (-0.36) (1.97) (1.17) 
    Nephew / niece 0.269 0.349 -0.198 -1.681** omitted 
 (0.94) (0.68) (-0.39) (-2.28)  
    Other relative / non-relative -0.642*** -0.141 -0.632 -3.151*** -2.898*** 
 (-2.70) (-0.26) (-1.43) (-6.17) (-2.90) 
Village Characteristics      
    Average distance to primary school (km) 0.016 -0.061 0.006 -0.041 0.452** 
 (0.43) (-1.03) (0.09) (-0.39) (2.34) 
   Number of primary schools -0.044 -0.087 -0.145* 0.277 0.155 
 (-1.27) (-1.53) (-1.94) (1.53) (1.16) 
   Number of secondary schools 0.030 0.179** -0.169* 0.256* 0.360* 
 (0.60) (2.13) (-1.93) (1.65) (1.67) 
   Pupil to classroom ratio -0.007*** -0.005 -0.011*** -0.013* -0.033*** 
 (-3.00) (-1.45) (-2.78) (-1.78) (-3.80) 
    Population Density (per km2) 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003* 
 (2.27) (1.21) (1.49) (1.29) (1.84) 
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    Distance to nearest town (km) -0.001 0.005 -0.003 0.021* -0.026* 
 (-0.25) (0.88) (-0.35) (1.87) (-1.70) 
    Road to nearest town tarmacked (=1) 0.243 0.344 0.067 -0.948* omitted 
 (1.46) (1.16) (0.20) (-1.78)  
Constant -0.760 -2.701*** -3.121*** 7.144*** 14.496*** 
 (-1.26) (-2.59) (-2.65) (3.11) (3.97) 
Agro-ecological zone dummies Included included included included included 
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.202 0.298 0.518 0.506 
No. of observation 1,336 310 342 337 242 
 
Note: 1. Numbers in parentheses are t-values and *** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % and * at the 
10 %. 2. The base dummy for the relationship to head is ‘Child’. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Delayed Enrollment by Gender (Probit Model) 
Variables All Boys Girls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Risk and Time Preferences of Household Head    
 Risk Aversion Parameter (σ) 0.077* 0.123** 0.040 
 (1.78) (2.10) (0.78) 
 Loss Aversion Parameter (λ) 0.010 0.011 0.009 
 (0.49) (0.38) (0.36) 
 Discount Rate Parameter (r) 0.001 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.96) (-0.02) (1.52) 
 Degree of Present Bias (d) 0.278 0.128 0.405 
 (1.49) (0.47) (1.59) 
Household Head Characteristics    
 Head Age 0.008 0.011 0.006 
 (1.47) (1.56) (0.82) 
 Female Headed (=1) -0.193 -0.291 -0.113 
 (-1.14) (-1.31) (-0.51) 
Household Characteristics    
 Highest Grade Completed – Male -0.010 -0.041** 0.019 
 (-0.65) (-2.13) (0.89) 
 Highest Grade Completed – Female -0.003 0.012 -0.021 
 (-0.18) (0.48) (-0.93) 
 Number of school-age children 0.026 0.056* -0.008 
(aged 6 to 18) (1.14) (1.81) (-0.27) 
 Number of infants (aged 5 or younger) 0.061* 0.079 0.038 
 (1.74) (1.62) (0.77) 
 Log of land size (acre) -0.007 0.008 -0.033 
 (-0.16) (0.17) (-0.59) 
 Log of assets value (USD)1 -0.132*** -0.147** -0.122* 
 (-2.60) (-2.06) (-1.92) 
Child’s Characteristics (age 6 - 13)    
Age 0.285*** 0.279*** 0.307*** 
 (11.78) (7.83) (9.38) 
Female (=1) -0.164*   
 (-1.94)   
Relationship to Head:     
    Grand child -0.387** -0.489** -0.364* 
 (-2.40) (-2.22) (-1.67) 
    Nephew / Niece -0.309 -0.711** 0.049 
 (-1.39) (-2.28) (0.16) 
    Other relative / non-relative -0.623*** -0.344 -0.947*** 
 (-2.77) (-1.09) (-2.74) 
Village Characteristics    
    Average distance to primary school (km) 0.044* 0.077* 0.020 
 (1.76) (1.88) (0.65) 
   Number of primary schools -0.005 -0.030 0.016 
 (-0.14) (-0.65) (0.34) 
   Number of secondary schools 0.032 0.050 -0.004 
 (0.76) (0.80) (-0.07) 
   Pupil to classroom ratio 0.003 -0.001 0.007*** 
 (1.63) (-0.25) (2.58) 
    Population Density (per km2) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.48) (1.31) (-1.49) 
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    Distance to nearest town (km) 0.003 0.000 0.005 
 (0.80) (0.04) (1.16) 
    Road to nearest town tarmacked (=1) -0.132 -0.026 -0.193 
 (-0.97) (-0.14) (-1.02) 
Constant -2.457*** -2.137*** -3.073*** 
 (-4.81) (-3.07) (-4.42) 
Agro-ecological zone dummies included included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.207 0.219 0.235 
No. of observation 1,187 571 616 
 
Note: 1. Numbers in parentheses are t-values and *** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % and * at the 
10 %. 2. The base dummy for the relationship to head is ‘Child’. 
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Table 6: Determinants of Educational Expenditure Per Schooling-Age Child (Tobit Model) 
 
 
Note: 1. Numbers in parentheses are t-values and *** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % and * at the 
10 %. 2. The base dummy for the relationship to head is ‘Child’. 
  
Variable  
Risk and Time Preferences of Household Head  
 Risk Aversion Parameter (σ) 5.969 
 (0.85) 
 Loss Aversion Parameter (λ) -1.361 
 (-0.33) 
 Discount Rate Parameter (r) -0.480** 
 (-1.97) 
 Degree of Present Bias (d) 27.890 
 (0.98) 
Household Head Characteristics  
 Head Age 0.648 
 (0.90) 
 Female Headed (=1) -53.117 
 (-1.35) 
Household Characteristics  
 Highest Grade Completed – Male 9.881*** 
 (3.11) 
 Highest Grade Completed – Female 12.123*** 
 (3.45) 
 Number of school-age children (aged 6 to 18) -7.735 
 (-1.64) 
Number of infants (aged 5 or younger) 0.761 
 (0.11) 
 Land (acre) -4.795 
 (-0.39) 
 Assets Value (USD)1 12.690 
 (1.26) 
Constant -252.741** 
 (-2.35) 
Village dummies included 
Pseudo R2 0.0439 
No. of observation 576 
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Annex 1: Mathematical model 
Assume a two-period model: period zero, the schooling period, in which the educational investment 
is made and period one, the post-schooling period, in which the benefit from the investment is 
harvested. We adopt the Levhari and Weiss (1974) individual maximization problem and construct 
the household model. Thus, the parent maximizes: 
  max
𝐶0,𝐶1,𝑆
    𝐸[𝑈(𝐶0, 𝐶1)] ,     (1) 
where 𝐶0  and 𝐶1  are consumptions in period zero and one respectively, and S is the schooling 
investment. 𝑈(𝐶0, 𝐶1), the utility function, is monotone and concave in both 𝐶0 and 𝐶1. Expectation, 
𝐸[. ] , is taken for the utility due to uncertainty. In our model, we further assume that current 
consumption is known so that the expectation is only taken for future utility: 
  max
𝐶0,𝐶1,𝑆
   𝑈(𝐶0) +  𝐸[𝑈(𝐶1)].     (1’) 
We further add 𝛽 that denotes the rate at which the parent discounts the future utility: 
  max
𝐶0,𝐶1,𝑆
   𝑈(𝐶0) + 𝛽 𝐸[𝑈(𝐶1)].     (1’’) 
The budget constraints in the two periods are:  
  𝐶0 = 𝑌0
𝑃 + 𝑌0
𝐶 + 𝐴0 − 𝐴1 − 𝑆,     (2a)  
  𝐶1 = 𝑌1
𝑃 + 𝑌1
𝐶(𝐻𝐶(𝑆), 𝜇) + (1 + 𝑟)𝐴1,    (2b) 
where 𝑌𝑃 is the parent’s income, 𝑌𝐶  the child’s income, and 𝐴 other assets including physical assets 
and net savings.  Here, 𝑌1
𝐶  depends on the human capital 𝐻𝐶and the future unknown state of the 
world, 𝜇 . Assume that 𝑌0
𝐶  does not depend on human capital gained from schooling. Putting 
equations (2a) and (2b) together, the inter-temporal budget constraint is: 
  𝐶1 = 𝑌1
𝑃 + 𝑌1
𝐶(𝐻𝐶(𝑆), 𝜇) + (1 + 𝑟)[𝑌0
𝑃 + 𝑌0
𝐶 + 𝐴0 − 𝑆 − 𝐶0].   (2c) 
The first-order conditions for the maximization of (1’’) subject to the constraint (2c) are: 
𝑈′(𝐶0) − 𝐸[𝑈′(𝐶1)𝛽(1 + 𝑟)] = 0,     (3) 
𝛽𝐸 {𝑈′(𝐶1) [
𝜕𝑌1
𝐶
𝜕𝑆
− (1 + 𝑟)]} = 0.     (4) 
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𝑈′(𝐶0) and  𝑈′(𝐶1) denote the marginal utilities from 𝐶0 and  𝐶1 respectively. Condition (3) states 
that the ratio between the marginal utility from present consumption and the expected marginal 
utility from future consumption is determined by the expected rate of return on other assets (1 + 𝑟) 
and the subjective discount rate β. Suppose that (1 + 𝑟) and β are known with certainty, (3) can be 
written as  
𝑈′(𝐶0)
𝐸[𝑈′(𝐶1)]
= 𝛽(1 + 𝑟),       (3’) 
(3’) states that the larger the value of β is, the larger 𝑈′(𝐶0) is relative to 𝐸[𝑈′(𝐶1)]. Therefore, all 
other things being equal, the more patient the parent is, the smaller the amount of household 
consumption allocated to today than to the future at the optimum. 
Condition (4) states that the utility weighted expected marginal benefit of additional earnings 
in the future due to schooling investment equals that which is due to investment in other assets. Note 
that the expected marginal rate of return from the schooling investment, 𝑈′(𝐶1) [
𝜕𝑌1
𝐶
𝜕𝑆
], depends upon 
𝑌1
𝐶 , which in turn depends upon the random variable μ representing future uncertainty. Therefore, 
assuming that the rates of return on the other assets are known, the more risk averse the individual is, 
the less investment is allocated to education than to other assets given that the rates of return are not 
so high that they more than compensate for the riskiness of the investment (Kihlstrom and Mirman, 
1974).13 
 
 
                                                     
13  Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) illustrate how the impact of risk aversion on risky investment is indeterminate 
depending on the individual behavior in relation to rates of return. For example, if the individual decreases investment, 
when the return is certain, then the higher the risk aversion, the more investment he makes in the investment with risks. 
